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THE GENERAL DENIAL IN MISSOURI
Although it is the most frequently used plea in Missouri civil
procedure, the denial has received almost no analytical consid-
eration. In practice, a general denial is incorporated in the an-
swer as a matter of course, followed by such affirmative defenses
as experience has taught cannot be sneaked past the court under
a denial alone. It is intended here to examine the theory of the
general denial and the availability of certain defenses under it
in Missouri. While in almost every instance the rule with its
exceptions has been long established, these rules have not, so
far as is known, been set out clearly in any one place. It is hoped
that this treatment will expose such inconsistencies as may have
developed, in order that modifications may be made better effec-
tuating the purposes of the Civil Practice Act.
A defense in bar must deny that the plaintiff has a cause of
action. Logically, such defenses fall into two classes:
I. Defenses which deny that the plaintiff ever had a cause of
action.
This class must either,
A. Deny the truth of the facts upon which the plaintiff
rests his primcz facie case; or
B. Show that the plaintiff's apparently valid pima facie
case never arose, because of the existence of additional
facts not alleged in the petition.
II. Defenses which admit that plaintiff's cause of action once
existed but show that it no longer exists.'
At common law, although the exact scope of the general issue
varied according to the individual writ, it was generally held
equivalent to a denial of liability. The defendant in most in-
stances was allowed to prove either that the plaintiff never had
a cause of action (class I), or that subsequent facts had extin-
guished the cause of action alleged (class II).2 The immense
scope of the defenses which could be presented under the unin-
formative general issue deprived pleadings of their notice value.
The resulting inconvenience of administration led to attempted
reform, in England by the "Hilary Rules,"' in the United States
by the Dudley Field Code of civil procedure. The latter was
adopted as the Missouri Civil Practice Act.
1. Compare classification in Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights
(1st ed. 1876) 679, sec. 644.
2. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 679-686, sec. 645-653.
3. See the opinion of Selden, J., in McKyring v. Bull (1857) 16 N. Y.
297, for an account of the English experience.
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The Missouri Code of 1849 abolished the general issue and
created as sole defensive plea the answer:
[This answer] shall contain: First, a general or specific
denial of each material allegation of the petition contro-
verted by the defendant, or any knowledge or information
thereof sufficient to form a belief * * *; second, a statement
of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim
* **4
A comparison of this provision with the outline of defensive
pleading set forth above shows that class I A defenses were in-
tended to be available under a general denial, and that class II de-
fenses were to be pleaded specially. The Code provision does not
distinguish between defenses which deny that a cause of action
ever existed and those which admit that a cause of action once
existed but claim that subsequent events have destroyed it. Such
a distinction is not really necessary under the Code at all, if the
phrase "any new matter" is interpreted as including class I B
as well as class II defenses. Under this construction everything
would have to be specially pleaded except denials of facts alleged
in the petition. This construction, arbitrary though it be, would
have left little doubt in the minds of lawyers concerning what
defenses should be pleaded specially. The court, in an early case,
Northrup v. The Mississippi Valley Insurance Co., expressed this
view very clearly:
Under the old system, by pleading the general issue every-
thing was open to proof which went to show a valid defense.
But the practice act, which has substituted for the general
issue an answer, and requires a statement of any new mat-
ter constituting a defense, in addition to a special denial of
the material allegations of the petition intended to be con-
troverted, has worked a complete and total change in the
principles of pleading. The defendant, by merely answer-
ing the allegations in the plaintiff's petition, can try only
such questions of fact as are necessary to sustain the plain-
tiff's case. If he intends to rely on new matter which goes
to defeat or avoid the plaintiff's action, he must set forth
in clear and precise terms each substantive fact intended to
be so relied on. It follows that when a defendant intends
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 776. The section as originally adopted was held
not to permit a general denial but only a specific denial of each allegation
controverted. It was amended in 1875. The fact that many of the cases
considered in this paper arose under the earlier version of the statute is
not material to the discussion. The scope of evidence admissible under the
denial of a particular allegation of the petition will be identical whether
that denial is specific or general.
NOTES1941l
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss3/9
400 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
to rest his defense on any fact which is not included in the
allegations necessary to the support of the plaintiff's case,
he must set it out according to the statute, in ordinary and
concise language, else he will be precluded from giving evi-
dence of it upon the trial.5
But prior to this decision, in Greenway v. James, the court
had introduced a different construction:
When a cause of action which once existed has been deter-
mined by some matter which subsequently transpired, such
new matter must, to comply with the statute, be specially
pleaded. But when the cause of action never existed the ap-
propriate defence under the law is a denial of the material
allegations of the petition and such facts as tend to disprove
the controverted allegations are pertinent to the issue."
This language distinguishes between defenses which deny that
a cause of action ever existed and those which claim that a valid
cause of action was later extinguished. It identifies the first type
of defenses as a denial of facts alleged in the petition, and the
second as based on "new matter." It is precisely on this point
that class I B defenses give trouble, for they are ambiguous: they
deny that a cause of action ever arose, but they depend upon
additional facts not alleged or denied in the petition. The diffi-
culties experienced by the Missouri courts in applying the code
provision to specific cases are most apparent in its treatment of
defenses of this class. However, chiefly for imperfectly expressed
reasons of policy, certain defenses of classes I A and II have
also been distorted from their positions in the logical scheme of
pleading set forth in the code. These inconsistencies also will be
considered in this paper. It should be remembered, however, that
the great bulk of I A and II defenses present no problem, since
the code provision for them is clear and is generally adhered to.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
It may properly be argued that non-compliance with the statute
of frauds is not a defensive plea at -all. The failure goes not to
the factual requisites of the cause of action but only to the method
of proving such facts. Plaintiff's evidence, however conclusive,
will be excluded because he is unable to present it in a form
acceptable to the court. In short, proof of the cause of action
is frustrated by a rule of evidence.
5. (1871) 47 Mo. 435, 444.
6. (1864) 34 Mo. 326, 328.
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This fact was recognized very early in Hook v. Turner,7 where
the court held that a general denial of a contract forces plaintiff
to prove its existence, which by virtue of the statute of frauds
cannot be done by parol. Objection to proof of the contract in
this manner was therefore sustained and the defense of the
statute made available without special pleading. Consistent with
this holding is the statement in Gist v. Eubanks8 that although
the petition did not allege a written contract it was not demur-
rable, since a defendant relying on the statute of frauds must
raise the point by answer. No mention was made of a need of
special pleading, and it may be assumed that a general denial
would have met the requirement. In Gardner v. Armstrong" the
court held a similar petition good as against a motion for a
directed verdict. However, by way of dictum, it was said that
the benefit of the statute was waived if not pleaded defensively.
These decisions, both of which, on the point decided, are con-
sistent with Hook v. Turner, indicated to the Court of Appeals
that
the rule in Missouri now is, contrary to earlier cases, that
one who would avail himself of the statute of frauds must
especially insist on it in pleading, or be deemed to have
waived benefit of its provisions. 10
Other decisions fortified the reversal, each successive decision
citing those which came before and ignoring Hook v. Turner."1
Nevertheless, in Allen v. Richard12 the court returned to the
reasoning of the Hook case and sustained the defendant's objec-
tion, under a general denial, to proof of a contract by parol evi-
dence. This holding came only six months after the pronounce-
7. (1856) 22 Mo. 333. See also Sherwood v. Saxton (1876) 63 Mo. '78,
for a similar holding.
8. (1860) 29 Mo. 248.
9. (1862) 31 Mo. 535.
10. Donaldson v. Newman (1880) 9 Mo. App. 235, 242.
11. Huffman v. Acdey (1863) 34 Mo. 277 (instruction on statute of
frauds refused under a denial of purchase and sale); Graff v. Foster (1878)
67 Mo. 512 (instruction on the statute refused "first, because it was not
pleaded * * * and second, because it had nothing to do with the case be-
cause the pleading admitted delivery"). In Gordon v. Madden (1884) 82
Mo. 193, the defendant pleaded payment to another with whom he alleged
the contract had been made, but did not plead the statute. The court denied
the instruction requested by defendant, "it being well settled in this state
that the statute of frauds to be available at the trial must be pleaded."
See also Rabsuhl v. Lack (1864) 35 Mo. 316, a favorite citation of this
period. Although the headnotes are in point, they vary considerably from
the holding of the case.
12. (1884) 83 Mo. 55.
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ment of a "well settled" rule to the contrary.13 Explaining the
decision the court said:
It is often laid down that the statute must be pleaded by
the party claiming its benefits. When the plea admits the
contract the statute must be pleaded. But when the contract
is denied the burden is imposed on the plaintiff to estab-
lish it by legal evidence. The defendant may raise his de-
fense at the time the proof is submitted by proper objections
to its admission.',
Again, in Springer v. Kleinsorge, decided the same day, the court
said:
* * * defendant, to avail himself of the statute of frauds
must raise the issue by answer. But it is not necessary * * *
[to] plead the statute eo nomine * * *. It is as fully raised
by a general denial as any other answer could raise it."
The present rule in Missouri follows these decisions and Hook
v. Turner in holding the statute of frauds to be a rule of evi-
dence preventing the introduction of parol testimony to prove
a contract, and such treatment is in accord with a logical con-
sideration of the functioning of the statute. 6 The opposite hold-
13. Gordon v. Madden (1884) 82 Mo. 193. It is difficult to explain the
apparently opposite holdings of the cases from 1862 to 1884 (see note 11,
supra), inasmuch as no reason for the shift was given by the court at the
time, and the later decisions returned to the logic of the Hook case. The
attempt in Springer v. Kleinsorge (1884) 83 Mo. 152, 156, to reconcile the
two lines of authority, while it justifies the actual holdings in certain of
the cases, does not explain the forceful dicta in these same cases, or the
directly opposite holding in the Gordon case in the preceding term of court.
It is possible that the Missouri court was following the lead of New
York, where early decisions admitting the statute of frauds under a general
denial were later repudiated. This theory is substantiated by the citation
of New York cases in support of a pre-code decision, quoted with approval
in the Hook case, and by the statement in Donaldson v. Newman (1880)
9 Mo. App. 235, that "the New York rule has been followed in later cases
in Missouri."
14. Allen v. Richard (1884) 83 Mo. 55, 60.
15. (1884) 83 Mo. 152, 155.
16. Under this rule plaintiff's petition is not subject to demurrer for
failure to allege affirmative compliance with the statute of frauds. Phillips
v. Hardenburg (1904) 181 Mo. 463, 80 S. W. 891; Martin v. Ray County
Coal Co. (1921) 288 Mo. 241, 232 S. W. 149. But if the petition affirma-
tively shows non-compliance it can be reached by a demurrer. Chambers v.
Lecompte (1845) 9 Mo. 575 (before code); Galway v. Shields (1876) 1
Mo. App. 546. The requirement that defendant make known to court and
opposing counsel his intention to rely on non-compliance may be met either
by an objection to the introduction of parol testimony to prove the trans-
action, stating the reason, Long v. Conrad (Mo. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 357,
or by a request for an instruction on the statute just before the case is
submitted to the jury. Widmer v. Moran Bolt & Nut Mfg. Co. (1918)
203 Mo. App. 293, 218 S. W. 351; George Gifford Co. v. Willman (1914)
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ing in the series of cases following Gardner v. Armstrong is
interesting in that it may represent a feeling that the notice
function of pleading would be better served by treating the
statute as an affirmative defense; or it may show a policy of
looking on the statute with disfavor and therefore requiring
defendant to set it forth. In either event it is submitted that
such classification, if desirable, must be made entirely apart from
logic, and the departure clearly recognized lest it lead to con-
fusion in the consideration of true defenses.
PAYMENT
The issue of payment must arise either in an action on an
instrument for the payment of money or in an action for breach
of a contract involving an exchange of goods for money. In
either case the plaintiff's petition, to state a cause of action,
must allege, (1) the instrument or contract, (2) performance
of his part, (3) non-performance by defendant. A general denial
of such a petition would be directed at the third allegation and
logically should permit proof of payment at or before maturity,
as a defense of class I A. A cause of action cannot arise before
breach, and there can be no breach before maturity of the in-
strument or contract other than an anticipatory breach. Pay-
ment after maturity would extinguish a cause of action already
in existence and so should require special pleading under class II.
It is generally held, however, that any payment, whether before
or after maturity, is an affirmative defense to be specially pleaded
by defendant, and that the allegation of non-payment is a mere
formal requirement of the petition which need not be proved. 17
187 Mo. App. 29, 173 S. W. 53; Smith v. Hainline (Mo. 1923) 253 S. W.
1049. The latter practice permits plaintiff to present all his evidence in-
cluding any possible matter taking the transaction outside the statute,
without interference, reserving to defendant the right to invoke the statute
upon failure of plaintiff to avoid its scope.
A "demurrer to the evidence" which does not state a reason why plain-
tiff should not recover does not fulfill the requirement of notice of the
ground of defense and therefore does not invoke the statute. Scharff v.
Klein (1887) 29 Mo. App. 549. For the same reason the statute may not
be raised for the first time on appeal, Wright v. Cobb (Mo. 1921) 229 S. W.
171; Mantz v. Maguire (1892) 52 Mo. App. 136, or on motion for a new
trial. Smith v. Hainline (Mo. 1923) 253 S. W. 1049; Schmidt v. Rogier
(1906) 121 Mo. App. 306, 98 S. W. 791.
If defendant's answer admits the existence of the contract plaintiff need
introduce no evidence to establish it. Under these circumstances there will
be no parol testimony of the contract on which the statute of frauds can
act, and defendant to avail himself of the statute must plead it specially
and introduce evidence of non-compliance. Smith v. Hainline (Mo. 1923)
253 S. W. 1049; Bless v. Jenkins (1895) 129 Mo. 647, 31 S. W. 938; Boyd
v. Paul (1894) 125 Mo. 9, 28 S. W. 171.
17. See Alden, The Defense of Payment Under Code Procedure (1909)
19 Yale Law J. 647.
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Much of the reasoning behind this departure from the logical
content of the answer can be traced to Justice Selden's celebrated
opinion in MoKyr ng v. Bull.k '8 It is said that payment is a
single act, non-payment the result of inaction, so that it is easier
for defendant to prove the single act of payment than for plain-
tiff to prove no payment on each day from the time of maturity
of the claim until the bringing of suit. If this be so, it extends
equally to all cases involving payment and places the burden of
proof of this fact on defendant. In order that the pleadings may
conform to the proof it is required that the defendant affirma-
tively allege payment in the answer.0 Logically then, if indeed
there is any room for the application of logic to this matter, it
would seem that an allegation of non-payment should not be
required in the petition. Actually this is also required because
it is one of the facts constituting the cause of action.20
The Missouri court has adopted this lump concept of payment
and the requirement that it be specially pleaded as an affirmative
defense, probably influenced in part by the opinion of Judge
Selden.21 The court, however, recognizes a class of cases "in
which non-payment is a material fact necessary to constitute
plaintiff's cause of action, 2 2 and in such cases holds that the
issue of payment is raised by a general denial. At the outset it
is clear that the phrase used is not definitive, non-payment being
in all these cases a material fact necessary to the plaintiff's cause
of action. The court is using the phrase as a label to indicate
18. (1857) 16 N. Y. 297. The opinion traces the history of the defensein England where, after a confused beginning, payment was finally per-
mitted to be shown in all cases under a plea of the general issue. Muchpoint is made of the confusion and lack of pre-trial notice leading to the
Hilary Rules which when amended required payment to be specially pleaded.
Selden, J., after stating that sanction must be found in the Field Code for
making payment an affirmative defense to prevent repetition here of the
tragic experience of England, practically creates such sanction by abstruse
reasoning.
19. See generally, for the reasoning advanced to support the treatment
of payment as an affirmative defense, Reppy, The Anomaly of Payment
as an Affirmative Defense (1925) 10 Cornell L. Q. 269. See also Lent v.
N. Y. & M. Ry. (1892) 130 N. Y. 504, 510, 29 N. E. 988.
20. Wisconsin recognizes the logical inconsistency of this requirement.
See Rossiter v. Schultz (1885) 62 Wis. 655.
21. The rationalization of its position is found in State ex rel. Spaulding
v. Peterson (1897) 142 Mo. 526, 532, 39 S. W. 453: "Payment is a fact
mot ordinarily required to be negatived in the petition and in such case is
new matter and to be made available as a defense must be pleaded. In
such case proof of prior indebtedness is, prima facie, proof of liability. A
general denial does not raise the issue of payment in such cases." It is
to be doubted, however, that the court would follow its logic and sustain
a petition not alleging non-payment against a demurrer.
22. Ibid.
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those cases in which it has for other reasons held payment not
to be an affirmative defense. These cases in Missouri are readily
classified.
It has been held that in an action on a bond given by an
agent to assure settlement of accounts with his principal, since
plaintiff must prove that the agent has not settled the accounts
in order to show a right of recovery on the bond, proof of settle-
ment by the agent was admissible under a general denial to show
that the alleged breach did not exist.2 3 A similar result was
reached in an action on a collector's bond.24 In an action in con-
version against a bank for failing to stop payment on a check
as ordered, it was held that evidence of payment of the check
before receipt of the order was admissible under a general denial
because, if the check was rightly paid, there was no conversion.25
In another case a partnership was dissolved, handing over its
assets to a successor firm which assumed its debts. The succesor
gave the plaintiff, a creditor of the dissolved firm, trade accep-
tances to the amount of its claim. In an action by the plaintiff
against members of both firms, it was alleged that the trade
acceptances were not paid. The court permitted a member of the
dissolved firm to prove under a general denial that the accep-
tances had been paid, apparently on the theory that after the
giving of the acceptances members of the old firm became only
secondarily liable, and hence that non-payment of the accep-
tances was a condition precedent to their liability.26
It will be observed that in all these cases the "payment" per-
mitted to be shown under a general denial was not a discharge
of the obligation sued on, but was instead part of another trans-
action, the improper conduct of which was a condition precedent
to the present liability of defendant.21
The rule in Missouri may therefore be stated to be that pay-
ment of the obligation sued on, whether before, at, or after
23. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Ginsley (1882) 75 Mo. 458.
24. State ex rel. Spaulding v. Peterson (1897) 142 Mo. 526, 39 S. W. 453.
25. Albers v. The Commercial Bank (1884) 85 Mo. 173.
26. St. Louis Perfection Tire Co. v. McKinney (1922) 212 Mo. App. 355,
245 S. W. 1100.
27. Two other cases frequently cited for the point that payment is ad-
missible under a general denial, Wilkerson v. Farnham (1884) 82 Mo. 672,
and Hall v. Smith (1910) 149 Mo. App. 379, 130 S. W. 449, actually in-
volve proof by defendant of a contract materially different from that sued
on. Such proof is always available under a general denial and if established
defeats plaintiff's cause of action. The payment permitted to be shown,
which was payment of the contract alleged by defendant, is, strictly speak-
ing, irrelevant in an action upon a materially different contract, since it
is not necessary to defeat recovery. This fact was recognized by the Court
of Appeals in the Hall case.
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maturity is an affirmative defense not available under a general
denial. But under a general denial evidence may be introduced
to negate the non-payment of an independent obligation which
non-payment is a condition precedent to liability of defendant
on the obligation supporting the plaintiff's action.
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL
Laches and estoppel both are class II defenses since they admit
that a valid cause of action once vested in plaintiff but show that
this cause of action subsequently was divested by certain conduct
of plaintiff. In the case of laches this fact was not always recog-
nized by the Missouri court.
Laches, or delay on the part of a plaintiff to assert a claim
formerly denominated equitable, is an equitable limitation of
action which cannot be a longer period than the statute of limi-
tations28 but which may be shortened by the court to any extent,
depending on the facts of each case. 29 When it is apparent from
the facts alleged in the petition that plaintiff has been guilty
of laches defendant need not answer but may by a demurrer call
upon the court to refuse relief.30 There is dictum in Bliss v.
Pritchard, which involved a demurrer, that "If plaintiff had been
guilty of laches but it did not appear in the petition, the de-
fendant, to avail himself of it, must plead it as a defense."31
This would naturally follow from the treatment of laches by the
court as a discretionary statute of limitations and the application
to it of a similar rule of pleading. However, in Kelly v. Hurt
an opposite rule is set forth:
To let in the defense that the claim is stale and that the bill
cannot therefore be supported it is not necessary that a
foundation be laid by any averment in the answer of the
defendant. If the case as it appears at the hearing is liable
to the objection by reason of the laches of the complainant
the court on that ground will be passive and refuse relief. 32
This holding was followed directly in Murphy v. De France,13
and was cited as "the better doctrine" in Stevenson v. Smith."
28. Hoester v. Sammelson (1890) 101 Mo. 619, 14 S. W. 728; Young v.Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1927) 318 Mo. 1214, 3 S. W. (2d) 381;
Kober v. Kober (1929) 324 Mo. 379, 23 S. W. (2d) 149.
29. Pike v. Martindale (1886) 91 Mo. 268, 1 S. W. 859.
30. Bliss v. Pritchard (1877) 67 Mo. 181.
31. (1877) 67 Mo. 181, 191.
32. (1881) 74 Mo. 561, 566.
33. (1891) 105 Mo. 53, 15 S. W. 949.
34. (1905) 189 Mo. 447, 88 S. W. 86.
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Consistent with this view was the holding that laches might be
raised for the first time on appeal.3 5
The defense of estoppel, legal and equitable, should be treated
at this time, because there has been a tendency on the part of
the Missouri courts to treat laches as a form of estoppel avail-
able only in equity28 While separate rules of pleading were justi-
fied as long as separate tribunals were maintained for law and
equity, since their amalgamation under the code the same rules
of pleading should be used for these similar defenses. Otherwise,
inasmuch as there is frequently a doubt at the time of filing plead-
ings whether a case is preponderantly in law or equity, there
will be some question which rule of pleading should be followed.
The Missouri courts have always held that in actions at law
estoppel, legal or equitable, must be specially pleaded ;37 but if
at the trial the evidence was introduced on the ground that it
proved estoppel and no objection was made, that objection was
waived.3 8 This same rule was adopted in equity as "the settled
rule"' ' 9 and reaffirmed in Central National Banl v. Doran,40 where
the court said:
Nor does it matter that this is an equity case instead of one
triable at law, since in either case no defense will be con-
sidered but which is embraced in the issues "raised by the
pleadings". 41
No reference is made in these cases to the different practice in
the treatment of laches, but the distinction probably would be
drawn between proof of acts of petitioner which estop him from
receiving relief and proof of delay in bringing the action, which
is called laches.
The final change in practice involving these defenses was the
requirement that laches, like estoppel, be specially pleaded. This
35. Dexter v. MacDonald (1906) 196 Mo. 373, 95 S. W. 359.
36. It is said that laches is to be distinguished from technical estoppel,
but the distinction lies chiefly in the tribunal before which the defense is
asserted and perhaps in the strictness with which the doctrine is applied
rather than in a distinction as to the theory of the remedy. Laches may
be asserted only in equity and, where applicable, may be said to estop
plaintiff from seeking equitable relief. "True," or common-law, estoppel
and estoppel in pais may be asserted either in law or in equity and may
also be said to estop plaintiff from seeking relief. See 2 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (3d ed. 1905) 1448-1450, sec. 816, 817.
37. Bray v. Marshall (1882) 75 Mo. 327; Noble v. Blount (1883) 77 Mo.
235.
38. Price v. Hallett (1896) 138 Mo. 561, 38 S. W. 451; Swinhart v. St.
Louis & Suburban Ry. (1907) 207 Mo. 423, 105 S. W. 1043.
39. Hammerslough v. Cheatham (1884) 84 Mo. 13.
40. (1891) 109 Mo. 40, 18 S. W. 836.
41. Id. at 51.
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reversal, however, did not come in one step. It began with a
dictum, citing no cases, in an action at law (where true laches
does not apply) that:
In * * * [certain equitable jurisdictions] disclosure of laches
by the evidence will authorize dismissal of plaintiff's bill,
although there is no formal plea of laches. The better doc-
trine is to plead laches.42
In numerous legal actions involving estoppel the court used the
word "laches" to mean any delay rather than in its technical
sense of "a delay which authorizes a court of equity to deny
relief."43 Together, these cases served as precedent for the state-
ment in a decision holding laches to be no defense to an action
at law that,
Furthermore, we do not find that laches, (using that word
in its proper sense and accurate meaning) is pleaded in the
answer of the defendant * * *. Laches, in order to be avail-
able as a defense to an equitable claim or cause of action,
must be pleaded.--
The stage thus was set for the application of this dictum to an
action in equity wherein the defendant, although not pleading
laches or estoppel, contended on appeal that the laches of plain-
tiff precluded recovery. The earlier Missouri cases,45 which alone
had the weight of precedent, were cited in support of this con-
tention. The court said, however, that
The respondents did not plead estoppel, ratification, or
laches, which they should have done since these are affirma-
tive defenses. Respondents have referred to several cases as
authority for the proposition that laches need not be pleaded,
but they are not in line with the Hicker case, and later deci-
sions there cited.46
Thus the change in the rule was made certain. It may now
be said that the defenses of laches and of estoppel must be
specially pleaded to permit defendant to introduce evidence on
42. Kellogg v. Moore (1917) 271 Mo. 189, 194, 196 S. W. 15.
43. Vanderline v. Smith (1885) 18 Mo. App. 55; Turner v. Edmonston(1907) 210 Mo. 411, 109 S. W. 33, 124 Am. St. Rep. 739; Coleman v. North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1917) 273 Mo. 620, 201 S. W. 544.
44. Hecker v. Bleish (1928) 319 Mo. 149, 172, 3 S. W. (2d) 1008, which
cited the Turner, Kellogg, and Coleman cases for this point.
45. Murphy v. DeFrance (1891) 105 Mo. 53, 15 S. W. 949; Stevenson v.
Smith (1905) 189 Mo. 447, 88 S. W. 86; Dexter v. MacDonald (1906) 196
Mo. 373, 95 S. W. 359.
46. Ambruster v. Ambruster (1930) 326 Mo. 51, 75, 31 S. W. (2d) 28,
77 A. L. R. 782.
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the point 7 But if either is apparent from the petition a de-
murrer will lie,48 or if apparent from the evidence of plaintiff
the court will enforce the defense although not specially pleaded.49
STATUTES OF LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
1. Property
The defense that the statute of limitations has run against a
cause of action is a typical class II defense, since it relies on
facts occurring subsequently to the facts alleged in the petition
(lapse of the statutory period) to defeat a once valid cause of
action. Therefore it must be specially pleaded and is not avail-
able under a general denial.,- There is, however, no inconsistency
between the statute of limitations and the theory of the general
denial and the two may be used concurrently.5 1
At this point reference must be made to legal conclusions and
their effect on defensive pleading. Legal conclusions are the legal
consequences of the facts alleged in the pleadings. At common
law, by the very nature of the writ system, a great deal of the
pleading consisted of legal conclusions which then had to be
substantiated by evidence. 52 It was the announced purpose of
the code to abolish such pleading and substitute the pleading of
facts; to a large extent this has been done.
In certain actions involving property it is held that the peti-
tion must show a property interest in the plaintiff sufficient to
enable him to maintain the action. This interest is usually repre-
sented by the legal concept of "title" and the courts, to avoid
47. Benswanger v. Liability Assur. Co., Ltd. (1930) 224 Mo. App. 1025,
28 S. W. (2d) 448.
48. Bliss v. Pritchard (1877) 67 Mo. 181; Stone v. Cook (1903) 179
Mo. 534, 78 S. W. 801; Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Northwestern Bank (1926)
315 Mo. 849, 288 S. W. 359; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2
v. Haid (1931) 328 Mo. 729, 41 S. W. (2d) 806.
49. Brown Construction Co. v. MacArthur Bros. Co. (1911) 236 Mo. 41,
139 S. W. 104; Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Northwestern Bank (1921) 290 Mo.
311, 235 S. W. 435; Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Northwestern Bank (1926)
315 Mo. 849, 288 S. W. 359; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2 v.
Haid (1931) 328 Mo. 729, 41 S. W. (2d) 806. Cf. Benswanger v. Liability
Assur. Co., Ltd. (1930) 224 Mo. App. 1025, 28 S. W. (2d) 448; Ambruster
v. Ambruster (1930) 326 Mo. 51, 31 S. W. (2d) 28, 77 A. L. R. 782. In
the latter case it was said, at page 75, " * * * whether there are exceptions
to the rule when plaintiff's bill on its face or his evidence shows laches is
a question not raised by the facts in this record."
50. Boyce v. Christy (1870) 47 Mo. 70; Linn County Bank v. Clifton
(1914) 263 Mo. 200, 172 S. W. 388. The same was true at common-law,
probably due to a dislike on the part of the courts of statutory encroach-
ment upon an otherwise valid right to redress. Tramell v. Adams (1829)
2 Mo. 155.
51. Nelson v. Brodhack (1869) 44 Mo. 597.
52. See Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 540, 541.
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inclusion in the petition of numerous facts, have held that the
requisite is met by the general allegation in the petition that
plaintiff has title53 Thus a material allegation of the petition
is a legal conclusion, which is put in issue by a general denial.
It is, therefore, held that under a general denial of title any facts
are admissible which go to show that title is not in the plaintiff.
Thus a great number of defenses of classes I and II are made
available without special pleading.
In attempted justification of this windfall for defendants it
is said that the defendant should not be required to be any more
specific as to the manner in which he will controvert the title
than the plaintiff is in his allegation. 4 It may be questioned
whether, in view of the liberties taken by the court with the
treatment of payment, such decorum is necessary. Though com-
pliance is achieved with the theory that a general denial puts
in issue all the material allegations of the petition, this is done
only at the expense of non-adherence to an equally worthy scheme
of defensive pleading.
Legal conclusions and kindred problems have been a source
of great trouble for the Missouri court, particularly in relation
to defenses of class I B. In seeking a solution for these problems
the court has made a number of conflicting statements which
have been only partially corrected, and, as will appear, these
statements in turn have given rise to new difficulties. This whole
matter will be considered further in connection with the de-
fenses of fraud, duress, and illegality.2
Since, after lapse of the statutory period of limitations, no
successful real action can be brought by the "owner" against
one who has held the land adversely for the period, the latter is
secure in his title and is said to have gained title by adverse
possession.- In an action between these parties, since plaintiff
must allege title, a general denial permits proof of these facts.
Thus, by the denial of a legal conclusion the statute of limita-
tions, a class II defense, is invoked without special pleading in
adverse possession cases.57
53. Young v. Glascock (1883) 79 Mo. 574, 577.
54. Sears, Proof of Fraud Under Denial (1897) 31 American Law Re-
view 865.
55. See page 414, infra.
56. Atkinson, Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations
(1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 157, 173; Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limita-
tions (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 914, 936; Nelson v. Brodhack (1869) 44 Mo.
597, 600.
57. Nelson v. Brodhack (1869) 44 Mo. 597; Campbell v. Laclede Gas-
light Co. (1884) 84 Mo. 352; King v. Theis (1917) 272 Mo. 416, 199 S. W.
183. Special statutes barring actions against purchasers at a tax sale or
Washington University Open Scholarship
2. Wrongful Death
Under the wrongful death statutes it is held in a majority of
jurisdictions that, since the statute creates a right and a remedy
which did not exist at common law, plaintiff in his petition must
allege facts which show compliance with the conditions of the
statute in order to state a cause of action.5 8 In the Missouri
statutes there are two distinct limitations on the bringing of an
action and the question arises whether these are conditions of
the statute granting a right of recovery so that their fulfillment
must be alleged by plaintiff. If so, non-fulfillment need not be
specially pleaded by defendant but should be available under a
general denial. The first provision, section 3262,59 vests the right
of recovery, "first * * * [in] the husband or wife of deceased; or,
second, if there be no husband or wife, or he or she fails to sue
within six months after such death, then * * * [in] the minor
child or children of deceased * * *." Section 326660 says, "Every
action instituted by virtue of the preceding sections of this arti-
cle shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action
shall accrue * * *." Although there have been amendments to
these sections, they do not affect the portions quoted.
It is settled law in Missouri that the bringing of an action
by the proper party within the time limit set for that party by
section 3262 is a condition precedent to the right of recovery
and must be shown by the petition. The point was fully con-
sidered in Barker . The Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R.61 The
court rejected the contention of plaintiff that the provision was
in the nature of a limitation of time only, affecting only the
remedy and limiting the enforcement of the right, and held that
the provision is not merely a limitation or bar to the remedy
from the federal government have been similarly treated. Burd v. Sellers
(1892) 113 Mo. 580, 21 S. W. 91; Fairbanks v. Long (1887) 91 Mo. 628, 4
S. W. 499. In the former case the court recognized a possible distinction
between the general statute of limitations and special statutes, in that the
former confesses absolute title by adverse possession while the latter bar
legal action, but held that all statutes of limitations applying to real estate
should be treated alike in the interest of uniformity.
In an action to quiet title, when the petition alleges plaintiff's title and
the fact that defendant claims some interest which plaintiff wants deter-
mined, a general denial apparently is unavailable as a defensive plea, since
by so answering defendant denies not only the title of plaintiff but also
that "he himself has any claim, title or interest in the land hostile to
plaintiff." Rohlf v. Hayes (1921) 287 Mo. 340, 229 S. W. 747.
58. Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations (1927) 36 Yale L.
J. 914, 926.
59. R. S. Mo. 1929.
60. R. S. Mo. 1929.
61. (1886) 91 Mo. 86.
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but a bar to the right itself, the fulfillment of which must there-
fore be alleged as a condition precedent to recovery. 2
Although there apparently is no case directly in point, it would
follow from the above that, since an allegation of compliance
with section 3262 is a material part of plaintiff's petition, this
compliance is put in issue by a general denial.
A dictum in the Barker case to the effect that section 3266
is a bar to the remedy rather than a condition precedent to the
right of recovery was followed in Cytron v. St. Louis Transit
C0.63 There it was said that the legislative intent to create a
bare statute of limitations is indicated by the title of the sec-
tion, "Limitation of Action," and that this intent should not be
permitted to perish through construction of the section as a con-
dition. Similar holdings are found in two Court of Appeals
cases.14 From these rulings it must follow that compliance with
section 3266 is not a material allegation of plaintiff's petition
and so is not put in issue by a general denial but must be pleaded
specially like other general statutes of limitations.
WANT AND FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION
In a contract action the petition must allege the mutual con-
siderations, performance or a tender thereof by the plaintiff, and
non-performance by defendent. This being true, it follows that
a general denial reaches both the mutuality (want of considera-
tion) and the performance by plaintiff (failure of consideration).
Failure of consideration, thus understood as a failure of per-
formance, would include any breach, however large or small, on
the part of the promissor. 65
Strictly speaking, both want and failure of consideration are
class I A defenses since plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case without negating both. Evidence introduced by the de-
fendant goes directly to controvert a material allegation of the
petition and therefore is not matter to be pleaded specially.
The question of availability of want or failure of considera-
tion as a defense under the general denial is complicated in Mis-
souri by two statutes. By the first,
62. Barker v. The Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. (1886) 91 Mo. 86, 92.
According to the court, this interpretation was made necessary by the inclu-
sion of the limitation within the very section which granted the right, and
by the confusion of litigation which might otherwise result.
63. (1907) 205 Mo. 692, 104 S. W. 109.
64. Bright v. Thacher (1919) 202 Mo. App. 301, 215 S. W. 788; May-
berry v. Iron Mountain Co. (1922) 211 Mo. App. 610, 249 S. W. 161.
65. See 3 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 2291, sec. 814. See also
O'Day v. Annex Realty Co. (Mo. 1921) 236 S. W. 22.
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All instruments of writing made and signed by any person
or his agent, whereby he shall promise to pay to any other,
or to his order, or unto bearer, any sum of money or prop-
erty therein mentioned, shall import a consideration, and be
due and payable as therein specified.6 6
This provision, read in conjunction with the second statute which
says, "Whenever a * * * written contract * * * shall be the
foundation of an action * * *, the proper party may prove the
want or failure of the consideration in whole or in part * * ,,,,67
gives the result that in all cases to which the statutes apply it is
not necessary for plaintiff to plead consideration or to make
proof of it in the first instance.," Since this is so, the defenses
of want or failure of consideration in such cases are affirmative
and must be pleaded specially and proved by the defendant.6 9
It will be noted, however, that contrary to statements in certain
earlier court of appeals cases70 the mere signature of defendant
to a written contract does not bring the case within the statutes;
it is also necessary that the contract be for the payment of money
or propery.71
The statutes do not apply to an oral contract or to a written
contract other than for payment of money or property.72 Under
these circumstances the requisites of plaintiff's cause of action
are those stated at the beginning of this section, and a denial
should permit evidence of either want or failure of consideration.
66. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2958.
67. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 954.
68. Montgomery v. Auchley (1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W. 425.
69. Montgomery v. Auchley (1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W. 425; Smith v.
Ohio Millers Ins. Co. (1932) 330 Mo. 236, 49 S. W. (2d) 42.
70. Montgomery v. Montgomery (1910) 142 Mo. App. 481, 127 S. W.
118; Fleming v. Mulloy (1910) 143 Mo. App. 309, 127 S. W. 105; Wallace v.
Workman (1914) 187 Mo. App. 113, 173 S. W. 35.
71. Thus, in Mueninghaus v. James (1929) 324 Mo. 767, 24 S. W. (2d)
1017, it was held that a petition alleging a written and signed contract to
do an act in exchange for another act was subject to demurrer for failure
to state a consideration. If, although his case comes within the statute,
plaintiff assumes the burden of proof of consideration and requests an
instruction which places the burden on himself, a verdict for defendant
will be proper if plaintiff cannot sustain the burden. Gibson v. Texas Pru-
dential Ins. Co. (1935) 229 Mo. App. 867, 86 S. W. (2d) 400. It was
formerly held that if, under conditions to which the statute would apply,
the plaintiff alleges a consideration it must be a valid one, or the petition
is subject to demurrer, Glasscock v. Glasscock (1877) 66 Mo. 627, but the
allegation is now treated as surplusage. Smith v. Ohio Millers Ins. Co.(1932) 330 Mo. 236, 49 S. W. (2d) 42. Under a plea of total failure of
consideration partial failure is available if instructions presenting the latter
issue are requested. National Tube Wks. Co. v. Ring Refrigerating & Ice
Mach. Co. (1906) 201 Mo. 30, 98 S. W. 620.
72. Mueninghaus v. James (1930) 324 Mo. 767, 24 S. W. (2d) 1017.
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The Missouri decisions on this point are not numerous and their
meaning is somewhat obscure, due in part to a confused use of
the terms want and failure of consideration, and in part to a
failure to distinguish between cases within and without the
statutes. Judging from dicta, it would seem that both want and
failure of consideration under these circumstances are available
under a general denial.73 Apparently the matter has never been
before the supreme court and has been considered only twice in
the courts of appeals.
In the first of these cases, an action on what was apparently
an oral contract not to sue, the court said: "As neither a total
nor a partial failure of consideration was pleaded, the questions
raised relative to consideration are not properly in the case."74
Cited in support of this decision is a court of appeals case involv-
ing a written contract. And in the second, clearly an action on
an oral contract, the court said:
The point that there was no consideration for the alleged
contract sued on cannot be relied on for more than one rea-
son. 1) Lack of consideration was not pleaded. 2) Even if
the contention in regard to consideration be considered an
entire want of consideration at the outset or a mere failure
of consideration the point must fail since adequate consider-
ation was shown. Again, the case was tried without sugges-
tion of any kind that there was any want or failure of con-
sideration for the alleged contract. Consequently, we would
not feel justified in reversing the case on such ground.r
The decision is correct in view of the second reason given, but
the first reason, although dictum, is disturbing.
It is submitted that no worthwhile conclusions can be drawn
from these cases. Probably the number of contracts outside the
statutes brought before the courts is so small that the lack of a
settled policy on the point is not of great importance. Aside
from matters of policy-for example, a desire to simplify plead-
ing by treating all contracts, written or oral, alike-both want
and failure of consideration should be admissible under a denial
of the contract, except in cases to which the statutes apply.
FRAUD, DURESS, AND ILLEGALITY
When fraud or duress is practiced on the promissor under a
contract, it must go either to the consideration or to the sur-
73. Moore v. Ringo (1884) 82 Mo. 468; Rico v. Peters (Mo. App. 1916)
185 S. W. 752.
74. Hyde v. Henman (Mo. App. 1923) 256 S. W. 1088.
75. Peppas v. Ehrlich & Sons Mfg. Co. (1934) 228 Mo. App. 556, 562,
71 S. W. (2d) 821.
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rounding circumstances. In either case the effect is solely on
the mind of the promissor as an added--or the deciding-factor
in his making the promise. The promise, consideration, and sur-
rounding circumstances are all there although perhaps in a
different form than was understood by the promissor, and a
petition stating these facts and omitting only the intangible
fraud will state a valid cause of action. If proof is limited to
these facts, recovery will necessarily follow. The same is true
when an unalleged portion of the consideration is illegal. The
burden rests on the defendant to prove additional facts which
will change the complexion of the transaction and prevent re-
covery. May he do so under a general denial?
Fraud, duress, and illegality belong to class I B or to class II
depending upon the view which is taken of their effect upon the
contract. If they make the contract utterly void, so that no
action could ever be maintained on it, they clearly belong to class
I B. If, however, it be held that such defect only renders the
contract subject to avoidance by an act of defendant, the ques-
tion arises what act is sufficient. It may be said that the de-
fendant's non-performance constituted an election to avoid, in
which case again plaintiff never had a cause of action, there
having been no breach prior to avoidance. But if filing a defense
to an action on the contract be considered the election, the breach
having occurred prior to that time, it would follow that the
plaintiff once had a cause of action, which was subsequently
terminated by the election to plead the defense. This last line
of reasoning would make fraud, duress, and illegality class II
defenses.76 Logically then, these defenses could be put into either
category.
76. Missouri courts have concerned themselves with the distinction be-
tween void and voidable only in those cases in which the party claiming
to have had fraud or duress practiced on him seeks an affirmative recovery.
In such cases it is said that fraud or duress renders a contract voidable,
so that the party may elect to accept the contract and sue for damages or
elect to rescind. If the contract extinguished a prior right of action and
the party wishes to rescind, the usual acts connected with avoidance must
be performed before an action may be brought on the prior right. Och v.
M. K. & T. Ry. (1895) 130 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962; Bushnell v. Loomis(1911) 234 Mo. 371, 137 S. W. 257. But where fraud or duress is claimed
solely as a defense to a contract action, the Missouri courts apparently
treat the contract as being void. See cases cited infra note 96. In the first
of these cases, however, the defrauded party brought a concurrent action
for rescission of the contract, offering to return all benefits received; in
the second case, evidence of fraud was insufficient and the contract was
enforced. Thus in neither instance did the defrauded party gain by treat-
ing the contract as void rather than voidable. Perhaps, in a case in which
defendant had received a benefit under the contract which he would retain
if the contract were treated as being non-existent, the distinction between
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In Greenway v. James,7 7 which recognized only the broad out-
lines of classes I and II, the court classified these defenses as
showing that a cause of action never existed, and allowed proof
of them under a general denial. Under this view, the plaintiff's
allegation of a valid "contract"-a legal conclusion-is treated
as a material allegation of the complaint. The general denial
then would open up all defenses, including fraud, duress, and
illegality, which go to show that a valid "contract" never existed.
However, later cases, following Northrup v. The Mississippi
Valley Insurance Co.,78 have further divided class I, and have
required the I B defenses to be specially pleaded. This is the
almost invariable holding in other jurisdictions. It is submitted
that the practical explanation lies in the judicial dislike of de-
fenses which impute bad morals, and that its logical justification
is found in the attempt of code draftsmen to avoid legal conclu-
sions and require pleading of facts. Considered in this light the
contract and its component parts, consideration, legal subject
matter, and meeting of minds, are but legal conclusions to be
avoided. The petition alleges only facts from which legal con-
clusions are drawn by court and jury. Then a denial puts in
issue only the facts of plaintiff's prima facie case, and the addi-
tional facts of fraud, duress, or illegality are new matter which
must be specially pleaded.
The two earliest Missouri cases in point under the code, Sugg
v. Blow79 and Sybert v. Jones,0 held respectively that fraudulent
representations of the promissor and illegality of consideration
could not be shown under a general denial. No reason was given.
However, the next case in point held that under a general denial
to a petition alleging trespass for taking of goods, evidence was
admissible to show that plaintiff obtained his title by virtue of a
transaction in fraud of creditors. This was Greenway v. James,81
source of the rule that anything which tended to prove that plain-
tiff's cause of action never existed is admissible under a general
denial. Thus was begun a line of decisions which is valid today,
although restricted in the main to actions in which the allega-
tion of the legal conclusion of title is material to plaintiff's peti-
tion. The rule has been extended to actions in replevin2 eject-
void and voidable would be invoked even where no affirmative recovery is
sought by defendant.
77. See also the discussion of this case supra page 400 and infra this
section.
78. (1871) 47 Mo. 435.
79. (1852) 17 Mo. 359; (1853) 19 Mo. 86.
80. (1853) 19 Mo. 86.
81. (1864) 34 Mo. 326.
82. Young v. Glascock (1883) 79 Mo. 574.
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ment,3 and to the defense to an interpleader in an attachment
suit.84
But the theory of the Greenway case also extended to other
fields. Thus, under a plea of non est factum to an action on a
note, defendant was permitted to show that his signature was
obtained through fraud.85 And the logical extreme of the theory
was reached in Sprague v. Rooney, 6 where in an action for
specific performance of a contract for sale of real estate de-
fendant offered to show under a general denial that the contract
was drawn as a substitute for a lease, to avoid a statute for-
bidding leasing of property for immoral purposes. The court
held the evidence admissible, "not to vary or control the con-
tract, but to show that in contemplation of law, in consequence
of the proven illegality, no contract at all ever had an existence;
that it was void ab initio."'18 The effect of the general denial
"was to deny that there was any legal contract in existence, and
therefore, that plaintiff had a standing in court."' 88
Meanwhile there was developing coincidentally a line of cases
following Sugg v. Blow. Thus evidence of champerty in an action
on a contract for legal services was held inadmissible because not
specially pleaded,"" the court saying, in Musser v. Adler:
It is not enough that evidence may appear tending to es-
tablish facts which if pleaded would defeat a recovery. The
general denial puts in issue the facts pleaded in the petition,
not the liability. The facts from which the law draws the
conclusion of non-liability must be stated in the answer when
not pleaded in the petition90
And at the term of court following Sprague v. Rooney, a deci-
sion, written by the same judge, reaffirmed the cases following
the Sugg case by holding that, in a contract action for rental of
ground, evidence that the rental was for Sunday athletic games
and so violated a statute was inadmissible under a general de-
nial."1 The decision applied the reasoning of the Musser case,
83. Smith v. Harris (1869) 43 Mo. 557.
84. Springer v. Kleinsorge (1884) 83 Mo. 152; Patton v. Fox (1902) 169
Mo. 97, 69 S. W. 287.
85. Corby v. Weddle (1874) 57 Mo. 452. The case was overruled on a
point of negotiable instruments law, but on the question of the availability
of fraud under a general denial the case was followed by South Side Buick
Auto Co. v. Bejach (Mo. App. 1932) 44 S. W. (2d) 870.
86. (1891) 104 Mo. 349.
87. Id. at 360.
88. Ibid.
89. Moore v. Ringo (1884) 82 Mo. 468; Musser v. Adler (1885) 86 Mo.
445.
90. (1885) 86 Mo. 445, 449.
91. The St. Louis Agr'l & Mech. Ass'n v. Delano (1891) 108 Mo. 217,
18 S. W. 1101.
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noting particularly that "nothing on the face of the petition * * *
indicates other than a valid contract between the parties * * *.,,92
No reference is made to the Sprague case, yet the holdings are
directly opposite. It is possible, judging from the relative space
devoted to the two points, that in the earlier case the judge was
more concerned with laying down the correct rule on the avail-
ability of illegality for the purpose of avoiding a contract than
with the manner in which the case reached the court.
In McDearmott v. Sedgwik, 3 the conflict was recognized and
the true rule stated to be that of Musser v. Adler. The Sprague
'case was expressly overruled, the court in effect holding that a
general denial does not raise the question of legality of the con-
tract sued on, since that is a matter of legal conclusion, which
under the code is not pleaded. A petition alleges only facts, and
only these facts, which as pleaded show a valid contract, are put
in issue.
The present rule, as stated in the McDearmott case, is:
* * * [if] the contract is offered in evidence in support
of the petition and its illegality appears upon its face relief
should be denied, whatever the condition of the pleadings.
The same is true where the plaintiff can only make out his
case through the medium of an illegal transaction to which
he himself is a party * * *. But when the illegality does
not appear from the contract itself or from the evidence
necessary to prove it, but depends on extraneous facts, the
defense is new matter and must be pleaded in order to be
available.- 4
It will be noted that the rule was developed in cases involving
illegality rather than fraud. This fact caused the appellate courts
for a time to admit fraud under a general denial, following the
rule laid down by the supreme court in property title cases."'
Recent supreme court cases"5 applied the settled rule of pleading
illegality to cases involving fraud, the first case achieving this
92. Ibid.
93. (1897) 140 Mo. 172, 39 S. W. 776.
94. Id. at 182. See also School District v. Sheidley (1897) 138 Mo. 672,
40 S. W. 656; Kellerher & Little v. Henderson (1907) 203 Mo. 498, 101
S. W. 1083; Bell v. Peper Tobacco Warehouse Co. (1907) 205 Mo. 475,
103 S. W. 1014; Shohoney v. Q. 0. & K. C. R. R. (1910) 231 Mo. 131, 122
S. W. 1025; State ex rel. Shawhan v. Ellison (1917) 273 Mo. 218, 200 S. W.
1042; Carter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1918) 275 Mo. 84, 204 S. W.
399.
95. See, for a discussion of these cases, Pattison, Code Pleading (2d ed.
1912) 569-575.
96. Carter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1918) 275 Mo. 84, 204 S. W.
399; Thompson & Co. v. Conran-Gideon Special Road Dist. (1929) 323 Mo.
953, 19 S. W. (2d) 1049.
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result by stating that a contract "conceived in fraud" is illegal,
having no legal existence, and thereafter citing cases on illegal-
ity to support the decision. Duress likewise must be specially
pleaded to be available97 It is logical that whatever the rule it
should be the same in each case.
Fraud or illegality is still admissible under a general denial in
actions involving title to property, but this is due to the peculiar
concept of title used in such actions rather than to the statements
made therein as to the scope of the general denial. The doctrine
that under a plea of non est factum to an action on a note the
defense of fraud is admissible apparently still survives, at least
in the courts of appeals.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the definition of the component parts of the
answer embodied in the Missouri Code is of small help in deter-
mining which defenses must be pleaded specially and which will
be available without pleading. Instead, the rule applicable to
each particular defense has been altered, reversed, and in the
case of the statute of frauds even brought back to its original
form by the court, which all the while has been conscientionsly
attempting to apply the theory of the practice act and of the
denial. Nor is the determination aided greatly by the explana-
tion of the code provision given by the court-that under a
general denial any evidence may be introduced which goes to
controvert "such questions of fact as are necessary to sustain
the plaintiff's case."'
A somewhat reluctant recognition has finally been accorded
the divisions A and B of class I, but that this was done to achieve
a desired result rather than out of a real understanding of the
division is indicated by the confused decisions on the point and
by the frequent resurgence of the blanket classification of Green-
way v. James, even in recent cases. A logical analysis of the
scope of the denial as defined in the practice act or by the court
is of value only as a point of reference from which the displace-
ment of various defenses becomes more apparent.
Since an adequate definition of scope cannot be formulated, it
is suggested that the proper approach lies in a code provision
listing certain defenses to be affirmatively pleaded. These de-
fenses might be determined by an analysis of the denial, as at-
tempted at the beginning of this paper, which would admittedly
97. Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co. (1909) 220 Mo. 580, 119
S. W. 565.
98. Northrup v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co. (1871) 47 Mo. 435, 444.
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bring about an arbitrary classification, no doubt with certain
injustices, or might be obtained from the decisions of the su-
preme court. Such a provision is found in many of the newer
codes.
Whether such a list should attempt to be all-inclusive, (with
of course a catch-all provision to take care of possible omissions)
or should concern itself chiefly with those defenses which have
caused the courts difficulties in the past is debatable. So far as
is known, no attempt has been made to assemble a complete cata-
logue of affirmative defenses and it seems highly probable that
in any such attempt one or more defenses would be overlooked.
While these would of course be handled by the catch-all provi-
sion, their omission would make the list unavailable as the ulti-
mate source of all defenses to be pleaded specially, which would
appear to be the chief justification for attempting to make it all-
inclusive. It might seem that the more complete list would be
an aid in drafting the answer, but this aid would be more appar-
ent than real. Aside from those defenses of class I which have
been handled differently in different jurisdictions, a number of
which have been discussed in this paper and all of which could
readily be listed, affirmative defenses are those of class II and
are readily recognized as defenses admitting the one-time ex-
istence of an obligation, but setting forth facts which prevent
enforcement of this obligation. It would seem easier for the
pleader to apply this simple test to the point in question than
for him to see if his facts come within one of the lump concepts
listed in the act, always bearing in mind that the list might not
be all-inclusive, so that in the end the test would be required
anyway.
The inclusion in the code of a clause requiring special pleading
of a defense which tended to surprise the opponent would abso-
lutely prevent the list from being all-inclusive. Such a clause
attempts to express briefly the intention that in addition to the
usual affirmative defenses listed, any other defense must be
pleaded specially which from the particular facts of the indi-
vidual case would seem to be unexpected and would therefore
give the unfair advantage of surprise to the party using it. Be-
cause of its very nature the clause cannot be made more definite,
and so an entirely new field of uncertainty in pleading is opened,
with the defendant not wanting to reveal unnecessarily an ele-
ment of his case, and yet fearing that his failure to do so will
result in the exclusion of his evidence. It is said that in practice
this dilemma is resolved by special pleading in all doubtful
Washington University Open Scholarship
cases ;19 however, it would seem that, as a body of case law
developed interpreting this provision, dealing perhaps with the
exceptional case in which the matter was not pleaded or with
the opposite extreme of pleading "evidence" rather than "facts,"'
loopholes in the provision against surprise would be uncovered,
once more bringing an element of uncertainty to the field of the
affirmative defense. The advantage to be gained by a provision
on surprise defenses is a furtherance of the notice function of
pleading, but it is perhaps to be questioned whether the provi-
sion does not mark a return toward greater bulk and intricacy
of pleadings with a resultant tendency toward trying the case in
the pleadings, and whether the true case of surprise cannot be
more effectively handled with simpler pleadings, allowing the
questioned defense to be raised for the first time at the trial, but
with a postponement to permit the marshalling of evidence on the
opposite side in the event of actual hardship. Furthermore, is
it not possible that the cure for surprise lies not in more complex
pleadings, performing the classical notice function, but rather
in the newer, less formal pre-trial procedure?
A final point raised by a consideration of defensive pleading
is the possibility of the entire abolition of the general denial,
using instead a specific denial of the individual allegations of
the complaint. An adequate treatment of this question would
involve weighing the advantages of a clearer statement of de-
fendant's position, with a resultant simplification of court pro-
cedure, against the practical point that often the simplest way
of defendant's assuring the presence of certain witnesses is to
make them also indispensible to the plaintiff's case; further bear-
ing in mind that no penalty has yet been devised sufficient to
prevent wholesale denial under the specific form. Whatever deci-
sion should be reached on this point would not affect the conclu-
sions of this paper, since whether a point is put in issue by a
general or a specific denial exactly the same procedure will be
followed thereafter.
It is, then, the conclusion of the writer that in any future re-
vision of the Civil Practice Act, the section on the answer should
contain the following provisions: (a) a definition of "new mat-
ter" as admitting the existence of a cause of action but claiming
that it was extinguished by subsequent events; (b) a list of those
defenses of class I A or I B which, for reasons of policy, it is
desired that the defendant plead specially.
J. J. THysoN.
99. See Sunderland, Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act (1934)
28 Ill. L. Rev. 861.
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